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Abstract 
 
The current study examines dishonest behaviour in the face of potential gains and 
losses in the presence of uncertainty. This experiment was conducted using the die-under-
cup paradigm (Shalvi et al., 2011) and used two hundred and twenty-five participants, 
recruited at Leiden University. In this study people had the opportunity to cheat by over-
reporting their results and securing a financial outcome, while remaining anonymous. 
Whereas the original task involved decision-making in a certainty context, this study 
made a slight modification to transform the setting to a probabilistic one. Potential 
consequences of distributing money prior to the procedure were tested by introducing a 
new no-cash loss manipulation to an otherwise replication study of previous work by 
Douma (2017). The introduction of this new condition provided support for the idea that 
people overstate their results to avoid experiencing a loss but not to secure an equivalent 
gain. This finding was only apparent when individuals did not receive any monetary 
contribution before engaging in the task, but were merely anticipating the distribution of 
cash. Possible explanatory relationships are discussed and suggestions for future research 
are provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is a common occurrence for people to be dishonest in pursuing their self-
interest. Nevertheless, they also resist the temptation to cheat in order to maintain a 
positive self-concept (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). In this sense, it is widely believed 
that instead of aiming to maximize profit regardless of whether it requires cheating, 
people are generally honest and driven by social norms to condemn lying. 
In some situations, the obtained outcome is dependent on whether or not one is 
being (dis)honest. Experimental studies have shown that in such cases, when presented 
with an opportunity, most people engage in cheating (e.g., Ariely, 2012; Shalvi, Dana, 
Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). Provided that higher results lead to more attractive 
outcomes, people appear to exaggerate their performance in order to benefit themselves. 
However, these findings come from experiments in which dishonest behaviour leads 
directly to the desired consequence. More precisely, it is certain that by lying participants 
will achieve a particular outcome. In this line of thought, it is intriguing to examine 
situations of uncertainty in which cheating could either lead to winning or to no gain at 
all. 
The vast majority of studies on cheating behaviours have used settings in which 
participants are sure to get a particular benefit provided that they lie. By doing this, 
research has been focused on examining people’s reactions in dilemmas in which they 
need to choose between the outcome obtained by being honest and the more beneficial 
consequence of cheating. Therefore, in such situations people are torn between the 
morally right decision and their self-interested preference to maximize gains (Ariely, 
2012). 
Laboratory studies aiming to examine cheating behaviours usually require 
participants to generate a random outcome, for instance, by rolling a die. The payment 
people receive is directly equivalent to the outcome of the roll in such a way that the 
higher the number they report, the more money they would be paid. An important aspect 
of these experiments using the die-under-cup paradigm, is that they allow for absolute 
privacy in the sense that the result can only be observed by the participant herself (e.g., 
Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Shalvi et al., 2011). Therefore, the lack of monitoring 
allows people to dishonestly report a higher result than the one observed, in order to 
secure a higher payoff.  
In general, the findings suggest that even though people overstate their results, 
they do not cheat to the highest degree possible. Instead, regardless of the fact that by 
doing this individuals forgo potential benefits, they are able to preserve their self-concept 
(Mazar et al., 2008; Ariely, 2012). When presented with a dilemma between cheating to 
increase gains and maintaining a positive self-view as being honest, people find 
themselves having to choose one option while sacrificing the other. Therefore, by lying to 
a smaller than the maximum extent, it is possible to serve self-interest and secure a higher 
payoff, while at the same time maintaining an honest self-concept. In this sense, people 
cheat to the extent that they are able to  justify their lying behaviour (Shalvi et al., 2011a). 
More precisely, reporting a five instead of a six following a die-roll would make it easier 
for a person to self-justify as sacrificing own interest by forgoing a bigger gain and 
believing it is something other people in this situation would not have done. 
Probability instead of certainty 
The circumstances in everyday life are normally, however, more ambiguous than 
this line of research suggests. It is rarely the case that people know with certainty that 
cheating will lead to the desired outcome. Instead, being dishonest simply increases one's 
chances of acquiring a particular benefit rather than securing it - for example, job 
candidates may cheat on their CV in order to increase the chance of being invited for an 
interview. Therefore, the current study introduces a slight modification to the original 
dice-under-cup task.  
In this experiment a bowl containing six white balls is added to the procedure. 
Depending on the outcome of the die-roll, these white balls are being replaced by yellow 
balls. In particular, the number that the participant reports leads to the substitution of the 
corresponding number of balls. Then, the participant is required to randomly draw a ball 
from the container and can either earn 6€ or nothing. If the drawn ball is yellow, the 
person receives 6€, if it is white, however, she wins no money at all. In such a setting, the 
outcome of the die-roll determines the probability of winning rather than the monetary 
value of the outcome and thus over-reporting increases the chance of getting a monetary 
incentive. 
 
The operating mechanisms in probabilistic settings 
The proposed modification to the die-under-cup task introduces a new and 
important aspect to the context – uncertainty. In general, people have a tendency to 
dislike situations with uncertain outcomes and are reluctant to make decisions until the 
ambiguity is resolved. This is mainly due to the fact that they want to avoid feelings of 
regret (Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996). After a decision has been 
made, people engage in comparisons between the current result and the outcome of the 
forgone option. If the actual consequences are worse than what could have been, had the 
individual chosen differently, she is likely to experience regret. This idea that people are 
regret-averse, leads to the assumption that in a probabilistic setting they would prefer to 
choose a sure win rather than risk not winning at all. Therefore, they will aim to remove 
the uncertainty and make sure they gain by overreporting six in the die-roll task. 
Hypothesis 1: People will over-report ‘6’ and under-report all lower outcomes. 
There is, however, the possibility that people are driven by a different motivation, 
which is likely to lead to dissimilar results. In particular, it is reasonable to assume that 
the introduction of a probabilistic setting to the die-under-cup paradigm would facilitate 
lying by allowing for self-justifications to be made. When people have rationales for their 
behaviour, it makes an unethical act feel less dishonest (Shalvi et al., 2011a). Thus, when 
the outcome of the die-roll is not fully dependent on a person's report, it should be easy to 
justify winning by attributing it to luck rather than cheating. In particular, even though 
reporting a six leads to a certain win, it can not be attributed to anything other than 
cheating. Nevertheless, any number lower than six reduces the 100% chance of winning 
and makes it uncertain and easily justifiable. Therefore, in an attempt to increase the 
chance of getting the desired outcome and at the same time be able to justify it, people 
will choose to report a five instead of a six. 
Hypothesis 2: People will over-report ‘5’s (and maybe ‘4’s) and under-report ‘6’s. 
 
 
The power of framing 
Since the two hypotheses make opposing predictions, it is important to consider 
the contextual characteristics that influence their relative impact. More precisely, in some 
situations the motivation to avoid uncertainty should be a stronger predictor of behaviour 
and should lead to overreporting of six. In other cases, however, the need for justifying 
cheating by attributing outcomes to luck should be dominant and cause underreporting of 
six. Thus, the way a situation is presented is a powerful determinant of which mechanism 
prevails.  
When presented with a choice, individuals usually evaluate options in terms of 
gains and losses relative to a reference point, rather than in total wealth. In this sense, 
people appear to be highly sensitive to changes in wealth and act differently depending 
on whether they are facing potential gains or losses. According to prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) the way choices are framed has a powerful impact on 
preferences. Therefore, it appears that the prospect of securing a gain is much less 
attractive than the possibility of an equivalent loss is undesirable (Ariely, Huber & 
Wertenbroch, 2005; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). The idea that losses loom larger than 
gains due to the greater steepness of the value function in the domain of losses, suggests 
that people are loss averse. Thus, framing effects play a major role in determining 
preferences and the actions that people take as a result. More precisely, the framing of a 
situation can have a substantial influence on cheating behaviours. The fact that people are 
loss averse should make them more likely to engage in unethical behaviours when they 
are presented with a decision in a loss rather than a gain frame. 
The major impact of framing on individual behaviour is supported by a 
considerable number of studies.  For instance, in a series of three experiments using 
hypothetical situations, Kern and Chugh (2009) showed that decision-makers behave 
more unethically if the consequences of the decisions were framed in terms of losses 
instead of gains. Furthermore, a study by Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2001) demonstrated 
that self-employed and business entrepreneurs' tax compliance is highly dependent on the 
reference point. In particular, expecting refunds was associated with high tax compliance 
whereas expecting to make additional payments led to lower compliance. Another 
relevant study by Cameron et al. (2008; cited in Cameron & Miller, 2009) implemented a 
self-reporting procedure to an anagram-solving task, which allowed participants to 
overstate their performance in order to secure a higher gain. The study showed that 
framing the outcome as a reduction of losses rather than a win, led to an increase in 
cheating behaviour. Closely related to the current research, Schindler and Pfattheicher 
(2017) used a multi-round modification to the dice task paradigm (Fischbacher & Föllmi-
Heusi, 2013) that allowed to demonstrate that people behave more dishonestly in order to 
avoid a loss than they do to secure an equivalent gain.  
Based on all of the evidence supporting the idea that losses are experienced more 
negatively than gains, uncertainty reduction would presumably be a stronger motivator in 
the domain of losses. This is further supported by the idea that people generally make 
decisions in an attempt to eliminate the possibility of experiencing regret (Zeelenberg et 
al., 1996). Based on the assumption that losses loom larger than gains, these feelings of 
regret should be experienced more negatively in a loss frame. Therefore, removing the 
uncertainty in the loss condition would be more important than in the gain frame so 
participants would over-report '6' to make sure they do not suffer a loss and thus 
experience regret. Since loss aversion appears to have a strong influence on cheating 
behaviour, people will be less concerned with making external attributions of their 
actions. Nevertheless, in order to be able to self-justify their behaviour by attributing 
winning to luck, people would over-report '5' (and maybe '4') rather than '6' in the gain 
condition. 
Hypothesis 3a: Loss framing will lead to over-reporting of '6's as opposed to all other 
outcomes. 
Hypothesis 3b: Gain framing will cause over-reporting of '5's (and maybe '4's), and 
under-reporting of '6's. 
 
Remote prizes 
A previous study using the same procedure (Douma, 2017) could not support this 
set of hypotheses. More precisely, the observed distribution in the gain frame condition 
showed a somewhat higher frequency of ‘4’s and ‘5’s, and a lower frequency of ‘6’s, yet 
this pattern was not significantly different from a uniform distribution. The results in the 
loss frame condition did not differ from a uniform distribution either, with the 
frequencies of reported ‘4’s, ‘5’s and ‘6’s varying between 14.7% and 17%.  Particularly 
the loss frame condition revealed the striking appearance of entirely honest reports. This 
interesting finding brought into question the procedure used for the study and whether 
there could have been something undetected that influenced the results.  
In this line of thought, the only difference between the two conditions was the 
presence of money. In other words, participants in the gain frame were merely told they 
could receive 6€ without them actually seeing the prize. Nevertheless, in the loss 
condition they were each given 6€ to keep in their wallet while rolling the die. Could this 
minor difference have affected the results? 
When considering dishonest behaviour it appears that increasing the 
psychological distance between the act and the outcome leads to more cheating (Ariely, 
2012). Therefore, people seem to be rather hesitant to be dishonest when actual money is 
present, but are more apt to cheat when being slightly remote from it. Being one step 
removed from money appears to have an effect on people’s sense of morality and thus 
cheating in such situations makes it easier to preserve one’s self-image.  
Hypothesis 4: In a loss frame without the presence of money, people will over-report ‘6’. 
 
 
Method 
 
A laboratory experiment with a between-subjects design was conducted in order 
to test the predictions. The experiment resembled the die-under-cup task (Shalvi et al., 
2011a). However, some modifications to the procedure were made and two additional 
questionnaires were introduced – one at the beginning of the experiment, and one 
immediately following the ball draw.  
 
Participants 
For the purpose of the study, participants were recruited at Leiden University. The 
process of recruiting consisted of advertising on the university’s website, as well as 
directly approaching potential participants on campus. The data was gathered from 225 
people - 162 of whom were women, 60 men and 3 individuals that did not indicate their 
gender (Mage = 21.13 years, SDage = 4.04).  
Most participants were introductory psychology students and received course 
credit for participation. The monetary compensation for taking part in the study, however, 
was dependent on the outcome of the die-under-cup task. Thus, participants could either 
receive an additional cash prize of €6 or go home with no additional cash prize. All 
participants were required to sign the informed consent before they proceeded with the 
experiment. 
 
Manipulation of framing 
In order to test predictions, a slight modification of the die-under-cup task used by 
Shalvi et al. (2011) was applied. In their study, participants reported the result of the die-
roll and received an amount of money that directly corresponded to the number they 
declared. In particular, reporting a two would earn people 2$, reporting a three would 
guarantee 3$, and so on. In the present study, participants first rolled the die and then 
picked a ball from a container. At the beginning of the experiment, there were six white 
balls in the container which could be substituted by yellow balls depending on the result 
that the participant reported. For instance, rolling a two led to replacing two white balls 
by two yellow ones, reporting a three resulted in changing three white balls for yellow 
ones, and so on. Then, after the result of the roll had been reported and the balls had been 
substituted, participants were asked to blindly take a ball from the container. Provided 
that the ball they picked was yellow, they walked away with 6€. However, if the ball was 
white – they left with no money. This modification to the original procedure was 
intended to transform the study setting from a certainty paradigm to a probabilistic one. 
Participants read that they would be given a paper cup, which had a die inside, a 
cover on the top and a small hole on the bottom. They would then have to shake the cup 
in order to roll the die, then look through the hole to see their result and report it. The 
reported number would then determine the number of white balls that would be 
substituted by yellow balls in the ball container. In the gain frame, individuals read that 
based on the outcome of the roll, they had a chance of winning 6€. Therefore, if they 
picked a yellow ball – they would earn 6€. In the two loss conditions participants were 
informed that they had 6€, which they could lose provided that they drew a white ball. 
The difference between the two loss conditions refers to the presence or absence of the 
money people could lose. More specifically, in the first of the two manipulations 
participants were given 6€ to put in their wallets before rolling the die, while in the other, 
they did not receive any actual money prior to the die-roll but were simply told they 
possessed it. Therefore, the latter manipulation was intended to be an exact equivalent to 
the gain condition with the sole exception of the wording.  
 
Procedure 
The experiment took place in the lab of Leiden University. Participants were 
invited in the lab where they first read and signed the informed consent, which introduced 
the experiment as a study on “uncertain events” and that all of the data would be treated 
confidentially. The main idea of the informed consent was to explain that participation 
was entirely voluntary and could be discontinued at any point, and also served as a first 
manipulation of the independent variable. In other words, depending on the condition that 
participants were randomly assigned to, the informed consent was framed either as a gain 
scenario, in which they could win 6€ (Appendix 1), or a loss scenario, in which they 
would face potentially losing 6€ (Appendix 2). After reading and signing the informed 
consent, participants in the loss condition with presence of money were given 6€ by the 
experimenter, were told that it was theirs now and were asked to put the money in their 
wallet. In the other two conditions no money was distributed prior to the manipulation. 
Then, participants were invited into an individual cubicle, where they had to fill in 
the first questionnaire (Appendix 3), handed in by the experimenter. The purpose of this 
questionnaire was to increase face validity of the research goal to investigate uncertainty. 
Participants were instructed to remain in the cubicle with the door closed and only open it 
when they were finished filling in their responses. One of the experimenters handed over 
the questionnaire and requested to stay in the cubicle and to open the door when finished. 
Then, the experimenter collected the questionnaire, provided the person with the 
instructions of the actual procedure and closed the door again. Participants were once 
again asked to stay in the cubicle with the door closed until they finish reading and then 
open the door again.  
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of three conditions – a gain 
condition, a loss condition with the presence of money, and a loss condition, in which the 
money was not shown. There were 75 individuals participating in each one. All three 
conditions applied the same die-under-cup task, which required people to roll a six-faced 
die placed in a cup that had a small hole on the bottom, all of which was explained in the 
instruction sheet.  
The die-roll procedure was designed in such a way that ensured participants that 
the outcome of the roll could not be observed by anybody but themselves. Not only they 
were alone in their cubicle with the door closed but the hole on the cup was just big 
enough for them to have to peak in the cup in order to see the outcome so nobody else 
could know what the die showed. Furthermore, in order to guarantee that the die was fair, 
participants were told they were allowed to roll it an extra two times but to ignore the 
outcomes of these throws and only report the first one. These subsequent rolls also served 
as an additional guarantee that participants’ actual outcome from the die-roll could never 
be known by the experimenter. 
Depending on the condition individuals were assigned to, they received either the 
gain-framed instruction sheet (Appendix 4), the loss-framed one where it was stated that 
they had received the money already (Appendix 5), or the other loss-framed sheet in the 
condition they received no cash prior to the procedure (Appendix 6). After reading the 
instructions and opening the door again, participants were given a decision sheet, which 
was again framed in terms of a potential gain or a loss (Appendix 7) and a covered paper 
cup with a die inside. They were once again asked to stay in the cubicle with the door 
closed until they finish with the procedure. Participants had to follow the instructions on 
the instruction sheet and open the door again once they had written down the number of 
the first roll on the decision sheet. They were then invited by the experimenter to come 
out of the cubicle to do the ball draw. For the ball draw, the experimenter substituted a 
number of white balls by yellow ones directly corresponding to the die-roll result that 
was indicated in each individual’s decision sheet. Then individuals were asked to blindly 
thrust their hand into the container and take a ball.  
In case a participant in the gain condition or the loss condition where no money 
was distributed drew out a yellow ball, she received 6€ from the experimenter. If a 
participant in the other loss condition got a yellow ball, she was told she could keep the 
6€ given by the experimenter. In that same condition, drawing a white ball resulted in 
participants having to give back the money, whereas in the other two manipulations they 
were merely told they did not win or they lost the amount of money that was never 
shown. Finally, all participants were then asked to fill in a last questionnaire, which was 
printed on a different coloured paper depending on the colour of the ball they had drawn 
(Appendix 8). The idea was to check for differences in feelings, expectations, motivation 
and possible explanations of behaviour of those who received 6€ and those who did not. 
All individuals then signed a sheet for receiving money (and/or ECTS) and read the 
debriefing form of the study (Appendix 9).  
 
Instruments 
The present study only required the use of a six-faced die, which was placed in a 
paper cup. The cup had a paper cover on top of it and a small hole on the bottom. Also, a 
paper box with 6 white table tennis balls was used. The box served as a ball container and 
additional 6 yellow table tennis balls were present to substitute (some of) the white ones 
when necessary. In addition, two questionnaires were used. 
 
Dependent measures 
Reported outcome. Participants' reported outcome served as one evidence of whether the 
framing manipulations actually worked. More precisely, the idea was to check whether 
the observed number of reported outcomes was different than an equal distribution in 
each of the conditions and compare. Since the probability to roll any of the numbers 
should be the same, observing substantially higher or lower frequencies of any number 
would indicate dishonesty. 
 
Questionnaires. In addition to the actual task, participants were asked to fill in two 
questionnaires. A custom questionnaire was created as a mixture between the Work 
Locus of Control Scale (Spector, 1988) and the FAD-plus Free Will and Determinism 
scale (Paulhus & Carey, 2011) and required participants to rate 44 statements.  
The FAD-plus scale assessed on a 5-point Likert scale (1=“strongly disagree” to 
6=“strongly agree”) beliefs regarding the extent to which different events are caused by 
free will or determinism (e.g., “No one can predict what will happen in this world.”). 
The FAD-Plus scale consists of 27 items divided into 4 subscales – Free will (7 items), 
Scientific determinism (7 items), Fatalistic determinism (5 items), Unpredictability (8 
items). However, in the current sample the Scientific determinism scale was found to be 
not reliable enough (N = 220, α = .51), so the items forming it were excluded from 
further analyses. The other three subscales had sufficient reliability – Free will (N = 220, 
α = .69), Fatalistic determinism (N = 218, α = .81) and Unpredictability (N = 220, α = 
.72) 
The Work Locus of Control scale measured participants’ attributions of various 
events to internal or external causes on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1=“strongly 
disagree“ to 6=“strongly agree” (e.g., “Getting the job you want is mostly a matter of 
luck. ”).The Work Locus of Control Scale (WLCS) consists of 16 statements, which form 
one general scale (N = 216, α = .75). All items phrased in terms of external locus of 
control were reverse-coded, so higher scores on this scale represent stronger internal 
locus. 
Furthermore, another questionnaire was used at the end of the experiment, straight 
after the ball draw procedure was completed. The main idea was to measure relevant 
constructs, such as Dishonesty, Trust and Uncertainty avoidance, which could possibly 
aid in the interpretation of the die-roll task results. This questionnaire used a 9-point 
Likert scale ranging from “fully disagree” to “fully agree”. There were 32 statements 
related to attitudes, perceptions and feelings about the procedure and the outcomes. A 
principal component analysis was performed on all items with the exception of the first 
one, which served as a manipulation check. Following this, three relevant subscales were 
created. 
Dishonesty (N = 219, α = .78) included four statements – “I thought about 
reporting a high number, even if I would roll a low number.”; “I felt that it was 
important to accurately report the number I really rolled.” (reverse-coded); “It was 
important to report my dice roll honestly.” (reverse-coded) “I think that it is okay to 
report a higher number in this experiment.” 
Trust (N = 217, α = .72) consisted of five items – “I felt that the experimenter 
trusted me.”; “The behavior of the experimenter showed that she fully trusted me.”; “I 
was convinced that the experiment would take place exactly as announced beforehand 
(i.e., in the informed consent and the instructions).”; “I fully trusted the experimenter.”; 
“It was important that I behaved in a trustworthy manner.” 
Uncertainty avoidance (N = 223, α = .80) included two statements – “Facing the 
uncertain outcome of the lottery was very unpleasant.”; “I felt uncomfortable not 
knowing whether I would draw a winning ball.” Initially there was one more statement 
part of the scale - “I strongly wanted to draw a winning ball”. However, removing the 
statement increased the reliability level from a = .68 and after thorough consideration it 
appeared to measure a distinct construct (e.g., desire to win). 
 
 
Results 
 
Manipulation check. One-way ANOVA was performed as a manipulation check, using 
the first item from the post-experiment questionnaire - “The uncertain event, that is, the 
result of dice roll and ball draw was about…”, which was scored on a 9-point scale 
ranging from 1 = “avoiding a loss of 6” to 9 = “achieving a gain of 6”. The manipulation 
check statement was used as a dependent variable and the experimental condition as a 
fixed factor, F(2, 165) = 5.78, p = .004, η2 = .007. The results from the manipulation 
check show that even though there was a significant difference between conditions, the 
effect was very small. Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni test indicated that the 
mean score in the gain condition (M = 7.36, SD = 2.02) was significantly different (p = 
.003) than the cash loss condition (M = 5.69, SD = 2.96), but not (p = .162) from the no-
cash loss manipulation (M = 6.44, SD = 2.61). Perceptions in the two loss conditions did 
not differ from one another (p = .359).  
It is worth mentioning that not all participants had filled in the manipulation 
check statement, which might have had an influence on the result of the analysis. 
However, the majority of people indicated an answer (N = 168), so this explanation is 
unlikely. 
 
Overreports of six. All hypotheses were tested with non-parametric chi-square tests to 
check whether the observed number of reported outcomes was significantly different than 
what would be expected by chance. In other words, since all die numbers should be rolled 
with equal frequency, the probability of each outcome should be the same, forming a flat 
line distribution of results. Therefore, there is a 16.7% chance to roll each of the six 
outcomes. 
In order to test the first hypothesis that people over-report ‘6’ and under-report all 
other outcomes to remove the uncertainty of obtaining the most beneficial outcome, a 
chi-square test on all data, regardless of condition, was performed. The observed 
distribution of data gathered from all two hundred and twenty-five participants revealed 
that the sample distribution of results was indeed significantly different from a uniform 
flat line distribution, χ2(5, N = 225) = 11.24, p = .047. As Table 1 shows, the dice face for 
which the observed number of reports deviated most from the expected number was the 
‘1’. In addition, there was a high deviation of observed reports from an equal distribution 
of ‘6’ as well, which might also have contributed to the significance of results. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1 was partially supported by the data - people under-reported ‘1’ (9.3%) and 
over-reported ‘6’ (21.3%). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Overreports of ‘5’ (and ‘4’). The second hypothesis predicted that people would over-
report ‘5’ (and ‘4’) and under-report ‘6’ in order to be able to attribute potential success 
to chance rather than own cheating behaviour. This hypothesis was tested using the same 
chi-square test, χ2(5, N = 225) = 11.24, p = .047. The pattern of results presented in Table 
1 does not support this prediction. There were slight over-reports of ‘5’ (17.8%) and ‘4’ 
(19.1%) but also over-reports of ‘6’ (21.3%), which contradicts this prediction. 
 
Effects of framing. The third hypothesis was divided into two predictions, depending on 
the framing of the procedure.  
According to Hypothesis 3a loss framing (both loss conditions) would result in 
overreports of ‘6’. To test this prediction, a chi-square test was performed on the data 
from the one hundred and fifty participants that were assigned to one of the two loss 
conditions (M = 3.93, SD = 1.58). There was a significant difference between expected 
and observed frequencies of reports, χ2(5, N = 150) = 12.72, p = .026. However, based on 
the information found in Table 2, it can be concluded that this is due to under-reports of 
Table 1. Observed and expected reported outcomes of all data 
 Observed  Expected N Residual 
1 21 (9.3%) 37.5 -16.5 
2 36 (16%) 37.5 -1.5 
3 37 (16.4%) 37.5 -.5 
4 43 (19.1%) 37.5 5.5 
5 40 (17.8%) 37.5 2.5 
6 48 (21.3%) 37.5 10.5 
‘1’ (7.3%), as opposed to over-reports of ‘6’ (22%). Thus, Hypothesis 3a was not 
supported.   
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, whereas reports in the gain condition were 
somewhat honest, in the loss conditions there were over-reports of ‘4’ and ‘6’ (and not so 
much ‘5’) and under-reports of all other outcomes (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Observed and expected reported outcomes by condition framing  
 Observed Expected N Residual 
Loss 1 11 (7.3%) 25 -14 
2 23 (15.3%) 25 -2.0 
3 24 (16%) 25 -1.0 
4 32 (21.3%) 25 7.0 
5 27 (18%) 25 2.0 
6 33 (22%) 25 8.0 
Total 150   
Gain 1 10 (13.3%) 12.5 -2.5 
2 13 (17.3%) 12.5 .5 
3 13 (17.3%) 12.5 .5 
4 11 (14.7%) 12.5 -1.5 
5 12 (17.3%) 12.5 .5 
6 15 (20%) 12.5 2.5 
Total 75   
 
 
Hypothesis 3b predicted that gain framing would cause overreporting of ‘5’ (and 
possibly ‘4’) and underreports of ‘6’. Non parametric chi square test was performed on 
the data gathered from participants in the gain condition only (M = 3.65, SD = 1.72), χ2(5, 
N = 75) = 1.24, p = .941. This result was non-significant, suggesting that the observed 
distribution did not differ from uniform and thus Hypothesis 3b could not be supported.  
Overreports of six in the no-cash loss condition. Finally, the last Hypothesis 4 predicted 
that in the loss condition, in which no money was given to participants prior to the ball 
draw, there would be a higher number of reported 6s than what would be expected by 
chance only. Hence, another chi-square test was run on the data gathered from the 
seventy-five people who were assigned to this manipulation (M = 4.11, SD = 1.62). The 
results showed that the observed data distribution was significantly different than a fair 
die distribution, χ2(5, N = 75) = 11.48, p = .043. Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 3, 
the biggest difference between expected and observed outcomes was exactly in the 
reporting of ‘6’s, which suggests that the significance of the chi-square statistic is due to 
this discrepancy. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported by the data. The findings in the cash 
loss condition were non-significant, χ2(5, N = 75) = 5.40, p = .369, so the overall 
significance in the loss condition was due to the effects of the no-cash loss. 
The results of this analysis also show a great difference between the expected and the 
observed reports of ‘1’s, which might also contribute to the significance of the test 
statistic. Even though this pattern was not part of the predictions, it might be interesting 
to discuss some plausible explanations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Observed and expected reported outcomes of no-cash loss condition 
 Observed  Expected N Residual 
1 5 (6.7%) 12.5 -7.5 
2 11 (14.7%) 12.5 -1.5 
3 10 (13.3%) 12.5 -2.5 
4 15 (20%) 12.5 2.5 
5 13 (17.3%) 12.5 .5 
6 21 (28%) 12.5 8.5 
 Relationships between measures. A correlation analysis was performed on the seven 
scales computed from the questionnaires (Locus of control, Free will, Fatalistic 
Determinism, Unpredictability, Trust, Dishonesty, Uncertainty avoidance), participants’ 
reported number and the experimental condition (gain condition=1, cash loss 
condition=2, no-cash loss=3).  
A Spearman's rank-order correlation test on the relationship between the 
experimental condition and each of the questionnaire scales and reported outcome. A 
Pearson correlation analysis between all scales and reported outcomes was run. The most 
interesting and substantial finding of this analysis was that there is a medium to large 
negative correlation between Dishonesty and Trust (r = -.450, p < .001). Therefore, 
stronger positive attitudes towards behaving in a dishonest way during the experiment 
were related to lower perceptions of trust between the participant and the experimenter.  
Although the effect was small, another intriguing finding was that there was a 
negative relationship between Reported outcome and Uncertainty avoidance (r = -
.164, p = .014). This result suggests that higher reported number were associated with 
lower levels of anxiety toward the uncertain outcome of the die roll. The rest of the 
findings are summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Correlations questionnaire scales, reported outcome and experimental condition 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The present work contributes to our understanding of cheating in a probabilistic 
setting. This study examined dishonest behaviour when facing potential gains or losses in 
the presence of uncertainty. This experiment was conducted using a die-under-cup 
paradigm, which gave participants the opportunity to cheat anonymously by exaggerating 
the outcome of the die-roll without suffering any consequences. They could then 
potentially go home with monetary incentives depending on the colour of a ball drawn. A 
novel modification to the usual task was the introduction of uncertainty, in the sense that 
the outcome of the die roll did not directly translate into the corresponding amount of 
money (Shalvi et al., 2011a) but simply increased one’s odds of obtaining 6€. Potential 
Variable 
M SD Condition Number 
reported 
Locus of 
Control 
Free will Fatalistic 
Determinism 
Unpredictability Trust Dishonesty Uncertainty 
avoidance 
Condition - - -         
Number reported 3.84 1.63 .112 -        
Locus of control 2.24 .48 -.100 .061 -       
Free will 3.44 .58 .013 -.064 -.199** -      
Fatalistic 
Determinism 
1.97 .70 -.166* .028 .267** .000 -     
Unpredictability 3.17 .57 -.108 .109 .179** .047 .220* -    
Trust 7.52 1.17 -.085 .129 .073 .109 .036 .160* -   
Dishonesty 2.64 1.61 .062 -.055 .088 -.112 -.153* -.017 -.450** -  
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
3.53 2.05 .017 -.164* .144* -.015 .158* .057 -082 .069 - 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
consequences of distributing money prior to the procedure were tested by introducing a 
new no-cash loss manipulation to an otherwise replication study of previous work by 
Douma (2017). The introduction of this new condition provided support for the idea that 
people overstate their results to avoid experiencing a loss but not to secure an equivalent 
gain. 
When presented with an uncertain situation, individuals tend to seek ways to 
resolve this unpredictability. The current study tested whether individuals would aim to 
secure their chances of obtaining the desired financial outcome by over-reporting ‘6’s and 
under-reporting all lower outcomes. This idea was partially supported by the findings. In 
fact, ‘6’s were indeed slightly over-reported but the more substantial observed effect was 
under-reporting of ‘1’s, suggesting that participants did exaggerate their performance but 
only to the extent to avoid almost certainly going home empty-handed.  
A plausible explanation of the results can be found in prospect theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979). A certain prospect is most influential on decision-making when it is 
transformed from unattainable to possible due to the steepness of the curve in its 
beginning. Even though reporting a ‘1’ does not entirely eliminate the chance of securing 
the 6€, the possibility is very small and therefore substantially underrated, so individuals 
attempt to increase their odds at succeeding. The same line of reasoning goes for over-
reports of ‘6’s – making a possible prospect a sure one is especially attractive. 
Furthermore, previous work suggests that in general, individuals aim to avoid situations, 
in which they will regret the decisions they did (not) make (Zeelenberg et al., 1996). In 
terms of the present study this means that since the possibility of experiencing regret is 
highly salient when the outcome of the die-roll is ‘1’, reporting any other number 
increases one’s chances of success and makes regret more unlikely. 
An interesting finding is that there were over-reports of ‘5’s and ‘4’s, even though 
the effect was only slight and not significant. This pattern suggests that overall, people 
tried to increase their chances of succeeding by exaggerating their performance. These 
findings are in line with previous work on cheating, specifically the concept of ‘ethical 
manoeuvring’ (Shalvi, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). This idea that people have a 
tendency to compromise between the desire to be moral and to serve own self-interest by 
not engaging in neither major, nor minor lies, explains the prevalence of ‘4’s and ‘5’s.  
Past research on framing effects in the die-under-cup paradigm supports the idea 
that people behave more dishonestly when faced with a potential loss rather than a gain, 
by overstating their outcomes (Schindler & Pfattheicher, 2017; Shalvi et al., 2011a). 
Although not by a large extent, the current results are in line with these findings – 
individuals in the two loss conditions exaggerated their performance by reporting higher 
numbers more often. The main finding was, however, that they also under-reported ‘1’s, 
which was not the case in the gain condition. Overall, these findings imply that people try 
to avoid a potential loss to a stronger extent than they aim to secure an equivalent gain, 
by being more dishonest (e.g., Kern & Chugh, 2009; Kirchler, & Maciejovsky, 2001). In 
addition, as already suggested in previous work (Grolleau, Kocher & Sutan, 2016), acting 
in an unethical way could be considered as more acceptable by third parties provided that 
the norm of being honest is not as strict in the domain of losses.  
Introducing a new manipulation to the experimental setting previously applied 
(Douma, 2017) provided evidence of substantial over-reports of ‘6’s. These findings 
could be attributed to the remoteness of money. Dishonest behaviour is facilitated by 
extending the psychological distance between the lie and its consequences (Ariely, 2012). 
Although individuals appeared to restrain themselves from cheating when money was 
given to them prior to performing the task, they did not mind exaggerating their outcomes 
when merely anticipating receiving payment. The new setting provided individuals with 
an opportunity to preserve self-concept and own sense of morality, while at the same time 
serving self-interest.   
In order to get a more in-depth understanding of the findings, the interactions 
between different factors were explored. Most importantly, the negative relationship 
found between trust and dishonesty implies that people who did not trust or feel trusted 
by the experimenter were more likely to engage in cheating. Past research on the 
influence of trust in subsequent behaviour shows that people who are lied to or distrusted 
by another person, tend to react with the same negativity towards that person and are 
more likely to engage in cheating (Houser, Vetter & Winter, 2012; Tyler, Feldman & 
Reichert, 2006). The results support the notion of negative norms of reciprocity, which 
favor retaliation as a suitable means to reciprocate to being subjected to negative 
treatment by another person (Gouldner, 1960; cited in Tyler et al., 2006). 
 Exploring the relationships between different constructs revealed the 
counterintuitive finding that uncertainty avoidance and individuals' reported outcome 
were negatively related. However, since this concept was measured after the actual 
procedure, it is likely that people's actual outcome distorted their memories about how 
they actually felt while performing the actual task. In a study on memory and emotions, 
Levine (1997) shows that present appraisal of a situation contributes to systematic 
alterations when trying to recall past events. Memories for emotional experiences are 
partially reconstructed and influenced by current judgment, meaning that an obtained 
financial outcome increases positive mood and thus makes it difficult to recall being 
uneasy about potentially going home without any money.  
 In general, the findings of the present study are in line with previous research by 
Douma (2017). More precisely, in her study people appeared to be honest with the 
presence of only slight over-reports of ‘4’s and ‘5’s, which completely corresponds to the 
present findings. Threfore, even though some predictions were not supported, it seems 
that the present work was able to replicate the past study’s conclusions and provide some 
additional interesting findings thanks to the introduction of a new manipulation. 
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
The current study was successful in finding differences in cheating behaviour 
when facing potential gains as opposed to losses, although some of the discrepancies 
were not significant. A possible disadvantage of the study’s design concerns the fact that 
most of the factors potentially influencing the outcomes were measured with a post-hoc 
questionnaire. Therefore, one should be extremely careful when drawing conclusions 
based on these findings since they might not accurately correspond to participants’ 
attitudes while performing the task itself, but be influenced by the obtained outcome. In 
this sense, a possible alternative would be to measure some of these constructs (e.g., trust, 
dishonesty, uncertainty avoidance) with another custom-made questionnaire prior to the 
actual procedure. Then, conduct the study a few weeks later in order to avoid potential 
priming effects of cheating. 
Furthermore, the main part of the findings came from correlational analyses so no 
definitive conclusions of causality could be made. Thus, it would be interesting to 
conduct a study with a different experimental design in order to explore various 
alternative explanations for the observed effects. Directly manipulating relevant concepts 
such as trust and uncertainty avoidance by introducing them in the experimental 
conditions could potentially aid in answering important questions about the nature of the 
effects. 
Moreover, the sample used in the present study consisted mainly of first year 
psychology students, who were granted 1ECTS for participation, regardless of the 
outcome of the ball draw. It seems therefore plausible, that they did not perceive the 
possible monetary outcome as an important stimulus when reporting their outcomes. 
However, this is unlikely the case, since cheating behaviour was present in one of the 
manipulations. Nevertheless, a possible idea would be to use a different sample, in which 
participants are not dependent on ECTS or, alternatively, make all distributed outcomes 
contingent on the colour of the ball drawn. 
Finally, previous research found that unethical behaviour for personal gain tends 
to increase in the presence of wealth (Gino & Pierce, 2009). However, the amount of 
money they used was higher than what was distributed in the present study, so it could be 
that the participants were not tempted enough to cheat. In this sense, a possible future 
direction would be to introduce a higher amount in the design to check whether the main 
part of individuals will still remain honest in general.  
 
 
Conclusion 
The current work contributes to the comprehension of dishonest behaviour in the 
face of uncertain gains as opposed to losses. In particular, this research was successful in 
replicating previous findings using the same procedure and demonstrating differences in 
actual cheating due to the introduction of a new condition. Overall, the study supported 
the idea that people tend to overstate their performance to avoid suffering a loss but not to 
obtain an equivalent gain.  
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Appendix 1 Informed Consent Gain Frame 
 
Informed Consent 
 
Thank you for participating in our study on uncertain events!   
  
In this experiment, you can win six Euro. Whether you win, will depend on a random 
ball draw. You will draw a ball out of a box that contains yellow and white balls. If you 
draw a yellow ball, you win € 6. If you draw a white ball, you win nothing. Before the 
ball draw you will first fill in a questionnaire.  
 
All your responses during this experiment will be anonymously coded and treated 
confidentially.  
You can stop at any time if you wish. If you any complaints, please contact dr. W. 
Steinel, wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 
 
Please sign below to indicate that you understood and agree with this procedure. 
 
Leiden, __________________ 
 
Name	 Signature	
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Appendix 2 Informed Consent Loss Frame 
 
Informed Consent 
 
Thank you for participating in our study on uncertain events!   
  
In this experiment, you start with six Euro. Whether you may take this money home, 
however, will depend on a random ball draw. You will draw a ball out of a box that 
contains yellow and white balls. If you draw a yellow ball, you may keep the € 6. If you 
draw a white ball, you lose the money. Before the ball draw you will first fill in a 
questionnaire. 
 
All your responses during this experiment will be anonymously coded and treated 
confidentially. You can stop at any time if you wish. If you any complaints, please 
contact dr. W. Steinel, wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 
 
Please sign below to indicate that you understood and agree with this procedure. 
 
Leiden, __________________ 
 
Name	 Signature	
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
	
Appendix	3	First	questionnaire	
Experiment:	Uncertain	Events	 	 	
Participant	number:	_____________	
Please	give	us	the	following	information	about	yourself	 	
I	am	a						 □ Man	
□ Woman	
□ Different		or		I	don’t	want	to	tell	
	
I	am	________	years	old.	
	
How	often	have	you	participated	in	similar	experiments	at	the	Faculty	of	Social	Sciences?	
□ Never:	This	is	my	first	time	
□ Once	before:	This	is	the	second	experiment	I	participate	in	
□ Twice	before:	This	is	the	third	experiment	I	participate	in	
□ Three	times	before:	This	is	the	fourth	experiment	I	participate	in	
□ I	have	been	participating	in	more	than	three	experiments	before	
	
How	much	do	you	agree	with	the	following	statements?	 strongly																					strongly	
disagree																									agree	
A	job	is	what	you	make	of	it.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
On	most	jobs,	people	can	pretty	much	accomplish	whatever	they	set	out	to	
accomplish.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
If	you	know	what	you	want	out	of	a	job,	you	can	find	a	job	that	gives	it	to	you.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
If	employees	are	unhappy	with	a	decision	made	by	their	boss,	they	should	do	
something	about	it.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
Getting	the	job	you	want	is	mostly	a	matter	of	luck.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
Making	money	is	primarily	a	matter	of	good	fortune.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
Most	people	are	capable	of	doing	their	jobs	well	if	they	make	the	effort.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
In	order	to	get	a	really	good	job	you	need	to	have	family	members	or	friends	in	
high	places.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
Promotions	are	usually	a	matter	of	good	fortune.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
When	it	comes	to	landing	a	really	good	job,	who	you	know	is	more	important	
than	what	you	know.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
Promotions	are	given	to	employees	who	perform	well	on	the	job.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
To	make	a	lot	of	money	you	have	to	know	the	right	people.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
It	takes	a	lot	of	luck	to	be	an	outstanding	employee	on	most	jobs.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
People	who	perform	their	jobs	well	generally	get	rewarded	for	it.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
Most	employees	have	more	influence	on	their	supervisors	than	they	think	they	
do.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
The	main	difference	between	people	who	make	a	lot	of	money	and	people	
who	make	a	little	money	is	luck.	 1					2					3					4					5					6	
	
Please	turn	over.	
How	much	do	you	agree	with	the	following	statements?	 strongly																strongly	
disagree																				agree	
I	believe	that	the	future	has	already	been	determined	by	fate.	 1					2					3					4					5	
People’s	biological	makeup	determines	their	talents	and	personality.	 1					2					3					4					5	
Chance	events	seem	to	be	the	major	cause	of	human	history.	 1					2					3					4					5	
People	have	complete	control	over	the	decisions	they	make.	 1					2					3					4					5	
No	matter	how	hard	you	try,	you	can’t	change	your	destiny.	 1					2					3					4					5	
Psychologists	and	psychiatrists	will	eventually	figure	out	all	human	behavior.	 1					2					3					4					5	
No	one	can	predict	what	will	happen	in	this	world.	 1					2					3					4					5	
People	must	take	full	responsibility	for	any	bad	choices	they	make.	 1					2					3					4					5	
Fate	already	has	a	plan	for	everyone.	 1					2					3					4					5	
Your	genes	determine	your	future.	 1					2					3					4					5	
Life	seems	unpredictable—just	like	throwing	dice	or	flipping	a	coin.	 1					2					3					4					5	
People	can	overcome	any	obstacles	if	they	truly	want	to.	 1					2					3					4					5	
Whatever	will	be,	will	be—there’s	not	much	you	can	do	about	it.	 1					2					3					4					5	
Science	has	shown	how	your	past	environment	created	your	current	intelligence	
and	personality.	 1					2					3					4					5	
People	are	unpredictable.	 1					2					3					4					5	
Criminals	are	totally	responsible	for	the	bad	things	they	do.	 1					2					3					4					5	
Whether	people	like	it	or	not,	mysterious	forces	seem	to	move	their	lives.	 1					2					3					4					5	
As	with	other	animals,	human	behavior	always	follows	the	laws	of	nature.	 1					2					3					4					5	
Life	is	hard	to	predict	because	it	is	almost	totally	random.	 1					2					3					4					5	
Luck	plays	a	big	role	in	people’s	lives.	 1					2					3					4					5	
People	have	complete	free	will.	 1					2					3					4					5	
Parents’	character	will	determine	the	character	of	their	children.	 1					2					3					4					5	
People	are	always	at	fault	for	their	bad	behavior.	 1					2					3					4					5	
Childhood	environment	will	determine	your	success	as	an	adult.	 1					2					3					4					5	
What	happens	to	people	is	a	matter	of	chance.	 1					2					3					4					5	
Strength	of	mind	can	always	overcome	the	body’s	desires.	 1					2					3					4					5	
People’s	futures	cannot	be	predicted.	 1					2					3					4					5	
	
When	I	am	in	conflict	with	someone	else,	the	BEST	outcome	for	me	occurs	when:	 	
□ I	behave	competitively	and	they	behave	cooperatively.	 □ 	
□ We	both	behave	cooperatively.	 □ 	
	
When	I	am	in	conflict	with	someone	else,	the	WORST	outcome	for	me	occurs	when:	 	
□ I	behave	cooperatively	and	they	behave	competitively.	 □ 	
□ We	both	behave	competitively.	 □ 	
	
Please	open	the	door	and	wait	for	the	experimenter!	
Appendix	4	Instructions	Gain	Frame	English	and	Dutch	
	
Please read the instructions entirely and carefully. 
 
In this experiment, your payoff will depend upon your decisions. All your decisions will be 
anonymous. You will indicate your decisions on a decision sheet that will be given by the 
experimenter during the experiment. There is no good nor bad answer.  
From now and until the end of the experiment, we ask you to remain silent. If you have any 
questions, open the door and the experimenter will come to answer your questions privately. 
 
General framework of the experiment 
 
In this experiment, you can win a prize of €6. There will be 6 coloured balls, either white or 
yellow, which are placed into a bowl. You have to randomly draw one ball which determines 
whether you win €6. If the ball you draw is yellow you win €6; if the ball you draw is white you 
win nothing. At the beginning of the experiment, there are 6 white balls in the bowl. The number 
of yellow balls that will replace these white balls depends on your dice roll. 
Before randomly drawing a ball, you will have to roll a regular, six face dice. More precisely, you 
have an opaque cup with a cover. The small hole located in the cover allows you to see the dice. 
You must shake the cup to throw the dice. Then put it down and, without moving the cup, take a 
look through the hole to observe the outcome of your throw. The number displayed by the dice 
will determine the number of yellow balls that will replace the white balls in the bowl (the 
decision sheet indicates the number of yellow and white balls according to each possible outcome 
of the dice). 
The first roll will determine the number of yellow balls located in the bowl. After the first roll, we 
ask that you roll the dice under the cup 2 more times so that you can verify for yourself that the 
dice is legitimate.  
Open the door after you are done reading these instructions, then the experimenter will give you a 
"decision sheet" as well as the cup so you can roll the dice. After rolling the dice three times, tick 
on the "decision sheet" the number displayed by the first roll. Leave the cup next to the computer. 
Give the decision sheet to the experimenter, so the experimenter can prepare the draw (i.e., 
replace as many white balls by yellow ones as the number you have rolled in the first dice roll), 
then you may randomly draw a ball from the bowl. If this ball you draw is yellow you receive €6 
and sign for receiving the money. If the ball you draw is white you will receive no money.  
 
Lees de instructies volledig en nauwkeurig door.  
 
Het bedrag wat je in dit experiment kunt verdienen hangt volledig af van je eigen beslissingen. Al 
je beslissingen zijn anoniem en niet bekend bij de proefleider. Je wordt gevraagd om je 
beslissingen aan te geven in de beslissingstabel, die je later tijdens het experiment zult ontvangen 
van de proefleider. Er zijn hierbij geen goede of foute beslissingen.  
Vanaf nu tot het einde van het experiment willen we je vragen of stil te blijven. Als je vragen hebt 
kan je de deur openen en zal de proefleider je vraag privé beantwoorden.                                                 
 
Experiment 
 
Tijdens dit experiment kan je €6 winnen. Er zullen 6 gekleurde balletjes, wit of geel, in een bak 
gestopt worden. Je zult gevraagd worden om één bal te pakken, zonder dat je ziet welke kleur 
deze heeft. Als de bal geel is win je €6; als de bal wit is win je niks. Aan het begin van het 
experiment zullen er 6 witte ballen in de bak zitten. Het aantal gele ballen dat de witte ballen zal 
vervangen hangt af van het aantal ogen dat je gooit met een dobbelsteen.  
 
Voordat je straks een bal pakt uit de bak, rol je dus eerst een dobbelsteen. Dit is een gewone 
dobbelsteen met 6 zijden. Deze dobbelsteen bevindt zich in een papieren beker die is afgedekt. In 
deze afdekking zit een gat, zodat je kunt zien wat je hebt gegooid. Om de dobbelsteen te rollen 
schud je de beker om de beker vervolgens neer te zetten. Zonder de beker te bewegen, kijk je 
door het gaatje in de afdekking van de beker om te zien wat je hebt gegooid. Het aantal ogen dat 
je hebt gegooid wordt het aantal gele ballen dat de witte ballen zal vervangen in de bak. (in de 
beslissingstabel kun je zien welk aantal ogen zorgt voor de verdeling in witte en gele ballen).  
Het aantal ogen dat je de eerste keer gooit met de dobbelsteen is het aantal witte ballen dat 
vervangen wordt door gele ballen. Vervolgens vragen we je de dobbelsteen nog tweemaal te 
gooien om voor jezelf vast te stellen dat de dobbelsteen goed werkt.  
Als je klaar bent met het lezen van deze instructies mag je de deur opendoen. De proefleider 
brengt je de beker met de dobbelsteen en de beslissingstabel. Nadat je de dobbelsteen drie keer 
hebt gegooid vragen we je in de beslissingstabel het gegooide aantal ogen van de eerste rol aan te 
kruisen. Je kunt de beker naast de computer zetten. Open de deur en geef de beslissingstabel aan 
de proefleider, zodat de proefleider de bak met ballen kan klaarmaken. De proefleider zal 
terugkomen met de bak waaruit je, zonder te kijken, een bal mag pakken.  
 
 
Appendix 5 Instructions Cash Loss Frame English and Dutch 
 
Please read the instructions entirely and carefully. 
 
In this experiment, your payoff will depend upon your decisions. All your decisions will be 
anonymous. You will indicate your decisions on a decision sheet that will be given by the 
experimenter during the experiment. There is no good nor bad answer.  
From now and until the end of the experiment, we ask you to remain silent. If you have any 
questions, open the door and the experimenter will come to answer your questions privately. 
 
General framework of the experiment 
 
You just received €6 which is now yours. A ball draw will determine whether you lose this 
money. In this experiment 6 coloured balls, either white or yellow, will be placed into a bowl. 
You have to randomly draw one ball which determines whether you lose your €6. If the ball you 
draw is yellow you may keep your €6; if the ball you draw is white you lose your money and you 
need to hand in your €6. At the beginning of the experiment, there will be 6 white balls in the 
bowl. The number of yellow balls that will replace these white balls depends on your dice roll. 
Before randomly drawing a ball, you will have to roll a regular, six face dice. More precisely, you 
have an opaque cup with a cover. The small hole located in the cover allows you to see the dice. 
You must shake the cup to throw the dice. Then put it down and, without moving the cup, take a 
look through the hole to observe the outcome of your throw. The number displayed by the dice 
will determine the number of yellow balls that will replace the white balls in the bowl (the 
decision sheet indicates the number of yellow and white balls according to each possible outcome 
of the dice). 
The first roll will determine the number of yellow balls located in the bowl. After the first roll, we 
ask that you roll the dice under the cup 2 more times so that you can verify for yourself that the 
dice is legitimate. Open the door after you are done reading these instructions, then the 
experimenter will give you a "decision sheet" as well as the cup so you can roll the dice. After 
rolling the dice three times, tick on the "decision sheet" the number displayed by the first roll. 
Leave the cup next to the computer. Give the decision sheet to the experimenter, so the 
experimenter can prepare the draw (i.e., replace as many white balls by yellow ones as the 
number you have rolled in the first dice roll), then you may randomly draw a ball from the bowl. 
If this ball you draw is yellow you keep your €6 and sign for the money. If the ball you draw is 
white you will have to give your €6 to the experimenter. 
Lees de instructies volledig en nauwkeurig door.  
 
Het bedrag wat je in dit experiment kunt verdienen hangt volledig af van je eigen beslissingen. Al 
je beslissingen zijn anoniem en niet bekend bij de proefleider. Je wordt gevraagd om je 
beslissingen aan te geven in de beslissingstabel, die je later tijdens het experiment zult ontvangen 
van de proefleider. Er zijn hierbij geen goede of foute beslissingen.  
Vanaf nu tot het einde van het experiment willen we je vragen of stil te blijven. Als je vragen hebt 
kan je de deur openen en zal de proefleider je vraag privé beantwoorden.                                                 
 
Experiment 
 
Je hebt zojuist €6 ontvangen wat nu van jou is. Je trekt zo een balletje, en daarvan hangt af of je 
dit geld verliest. Tijdens dit experiment zullen er 6 gekleurde balletjes, wit of geel, in een bak 
gestopt worden. Je zult gevraagd worden om één bal te pakken, zonder dat je ziet welke kleur 
deze heeft. Als de bal geel is mag je je €6 houden; als de bal wit is moet je je €6 inleveren. Aan 
het begin van het experiment zullen er 6 witte ballen in de bak zitten. Het aantal gele ballen dat de 
witte ballen zal vervangen hangt af van het aantal ogen dat je gooit met een dobbelsteen. 
 
Voordat je straks een bal pakt uit de bak, rol je dus eerst een dobbelsteen. Dit is een gewone 
dobbelsteen met 6 zijden. Deze dobbelsteen bevindt zich in een papieren beker die is afgedekt. In 
deze afdekking zit een gat, zodat je kunt zien wat je hebt gegooid. Om de dobbelsteen te rollen 
schud je de beker om de beker vervolgens neer te zetten. Zonder de beker te bewegen, kijk je 
door het gaatje in de afdekking van de beker om te zien wat je hebt gegooid. Het aantal ogen dat 
je hebt gegooid wordt het aantal gele ballen dat de witte ballen zal vervangen in de bak. (in de 
beslissingstabel kun je zien welk aantal ogen zorgt voor de verdeling in witte en gele ballen).  
 
Het aantal ogen dat je de eerste keer gooit met de dobbelsteen is het aantal witte ballen dat 
vervangen wordt door gele ballen. Vervolgens vragen we je de dobbelsteen nog tweemaal te 
gooien om voor jezelf vast te stellen dat de dobbelsteen goed werkt.  
 
Als je klaar bent met het lezen van deze instructies mag je de deur opendoen. De proefleider 
brengt je de beker met de dobbelsteen en de beslissingstabel. Nadat je de dobbelsteen drie keer 
hebt gegooid vragen we je in de beslissingstabel het gegooide aantal ogen van de eerste rol aan te 
kruisen. Je kunt de beker naast de computer zetten. Open de deur en geef de beslissingstabel aan 
de proefleider, zodat de proefleider de bak met ballen kan klaarmaken. De proefleider zal 
terugkomen met de bak waaruit je, zonder te kijken, een bal mag pakken. 
Appendix 6 Instructions No-Cash Loss Frame English and Dutch 
 
Please read the instructions entirely and carefully. 
 
In this experiment, your payoff will depend upon your decisions. All your decisions will be 
anonymous. You will indicate your decisions on a decision sheet that will be given by the 
experimenter during the experiment. There is no good nor bad answer.  
From now and until the end of the experiment, we ask you to remain silent. If you have any 
questions, open the door and the experimenter will come to answer your questions privately. 
 
General framework of the experiment 
	
You start with €6. A ball draw will determine whether you lose this money. In this experiment 6 
coloured balls, either white or yellow, will be placed into a bowl. You have to randomly draw one 
ball which determines whether you lose your €6. If the ball you draw is yellow you keep the €6 
and may take the money home; if the ball you draw is white you lose the €6. At the beginning of 
the experiment, there will be 6 white balls in the bowl. The number of yellow balls that will 
replace these white balls depends on your dice roll. 
Before randomly drawing a ball, you will have to roll a regular, six face dice. More precisely, you 
have an opaque cup with a cover. The small hole located in the cover allows you to see the dice. 
You must shake the cup to throw the dice. Then put it down and, without moving the cup, take a 
look through the hole to observe the outcome of your throw. The number displayed by the dice 
will determine the number of yellow balls that will replace the white balls in the bowl (the 
decision sheet indicates the number of yellow and white balls according to each possible outcome 
of the dice). 
The first roll will determine the number of yellow balls located in the bowl. After the first roll, we 
ask that you roll the dice under the cup two more times so that you can verify for yourself that the 
dice is legitimate.  
Open the door after you are done reading these instructions, then the experimenter will give you a 
"decision sheet" as well as the cup so you can roll the dice. After rolling the dice three times, tick 
on the "decision sheet" the number displayed by the first roll. Leave the cup next to the computer. 
Give the decision sheet to the experimenter, so the experimenter can prepare the draw (i.e., 
replace as many white balls by yellow ones as the number you have rolled in the first dice roll), 
then you may randomly draw a ball from the bowl. If this ball you draw is yellow you keep the 
€6, sign for it and take the money home. If the ball you draw is white you lose the €6 you started 
with. 
Lees de instructies volledig en nauwkeurig door.  
Het bedrag wat je in dit experiment kunt verdienen hangt volledig af van je eigen beslissingen. Al 
je beslissingen zijn anoniem en niet bekend bij de proefleider. Je wordt gevraagd om je 
beslissingen aan te geven in de beslissingstabel, die je later tijdens het experiment zult ontvangen 
van de proefleider. Er zijn hierbij geen goede of foute beslissingen.  
Vanaf nu tot het einde van het experiment willen we je vragen of stil te blijven. Als je vragen hebt 
kan je de deur openen en zal de proefleider je vraag privé beantwoorden.																																																		
Experiment 
Je begint met €6. Je trekt zo een balletje, en daarvan hangt af of je dit geld verliest. Tijdens dit 
experiment zullen er 6 gekleurde balletjes, wit of geel, in een bak gestopt worden. Je zult 
gevraagd worden om één bal te pakken, zonder dat je ziet welke kleur deze heeft. Als de bal geel 
is houdt je de €6 en mag je het geld mee naar huis nemen; als de bal wit is verlies je de €6. Aan 
het begin van het experiment zullen er 6 witte ballen in de bak zitten. Het aantal gele ballen dat de 
witte ballen zal vervangen hangt af van het aantal ogen dat je gooit met een dobbelsteen. 
 
Voordat je straks een bal pakt uit de bak, rol je dus eerst een dobbelsteen. Dit is een gewone 
dobbelsteen met 6 zijden. Deze dobbelsteen bevindt zich in een papieren beker die is afgedekt. In 
deze afdekking zit een gat, zodat je kunt zien wat je hebt gegooid. Om de dobbelsteen te rollen 
schud je de beker om de beker vervolgens neer te zetten. Zonder de beker te bewegen, kijk je 
door het gaatje in de afdekking van de beker om te zien wat je hebt gegooid. Het aantal ogen dat 
je hebt gegooid wordt het aantal gele ballen dat de witte ballen zal vervangen in de bak. (in de 
beslissingstabel kun je zien welk aantal ogen zorgt voor de verdeling in witte en gele ballen).  
 
Het aantal ogen dat je de eerste keer gooit met de dobbelsteen is het aantal witte ballen dat 
vervangen wordt door gele ballen. Vervolgens vragen we je de dobbelsteen nog tweemaal te 
gooien om voor jezelf vast te stellen dat de dobbelsteen goed werkt.  
 
Als je klaar bent met het lezen van deze instructies mag je de deur opendoen. De proefleider 
brengt je de beker met de dobbelsteen en de beslissingstabel. Nadat je de dobbelsteen drie keer 
hebt gegooid vragen we je in de beslissingstabel het gegooide aantal ogen van de eerste rol aan te 
kruisen. Je kunt de beker naast de computer zetten. Open de deur en geef de beslissingstabel aan 
de proefleider, zodat de proefleider de bak met ballen kan klaarmaken. De proefleider zal 
terugkomen met de bak waaruit je, zonder te kijken, een bal mag pakken.  
 
Appendix 7 Decision Sheet Gain and Loss 
	
Number	
displayed	by	
the	dice	
Number	of	
yellow	balls	
Number	of	
white	balls	
You	win	
(if	you	draw	a	
yellow	ball)	
Tick	the	
number	rolled	
(X)	
Aantal	ogen	op	
de	dobbelsteen	
Aantal	gele	
ballen	
Aantal	witte	
ballen	
Als	je	een	gele	
bal	pakt	win	
je:	
Kruis	het	
aantal	ogen	
aan	(X)	
	 1	 5	 €6	 	
	 2	 4	 €6	 	
	 3	 3	 €6	 	
	 4	 2	 €6	 	
	 5	 1	 €6	 	
	 6	 0	 €6	 	
	
Number	
displayed	by	
the	dice	
Number	of	
yellow	balls	
Number	of	
white	balls	
You	will	lose		
(if	you	draw	a	
white	ball)	
Tick	the	
number	rolled	
(X)	
Aantal	ogen	op	
de	dobbelsteen	
Aantal	gele	
ballen	
Aantal	witte	
ballen	
Als	je	een	witte	
bal	pakt	verlies	
je:	
Kruis	het	
aantal	ogen	
aan	(X)	
	 1	 5	 -€6	 	
	 2	 4	 -€6	 	
	 3	 3	 -€6	 	
	 4	 2	 -€6	 	
	 5	 1	 -€6	 	
	 6	 0	 -€6	 	
	
 
 
Appendix 8 Post-hoc questionnaire 
 
Please fill in this short questionnaire! 
 
Ppnr:  
The following questions are about how you felt in the beginning of this study, that is, after 
you read the laminated instructions, and before you filled in the questionnaire. 
The uncertain event, that is, the result of dice roll and ball draw was about...  
avoiding a loss of 6 Euro    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    achieving a gain of 6 Euro    
+  How much do you agree with the following statements? fully                                     
fully   
disagree                           
agree 
Facing the uncertain outcome of the lottery was very unpleasant. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I felt uncomfortable not knowing whether I would draw a winning 
ball. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I strongly wanted to draw a winning ball. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I felt that the experimenter trusted me. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
The behavior of the experimenter showed that she fully trusted me. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I was convinced that the experiment would take place exactly as 
announced beforehand (i.e., in the informed consent and the 
instructions). 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I was convinced that my subsequent behavior (the dice roll and the 
ball draw) would really have financial consequences.  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I doubted that the experimenter would really do what the 
instructions announced.  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I fully trusted the experimenter.  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I thought that the experimenter behaved in a naïve way. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
It was important that I behaved in a trustworthy manner. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
Which number did you hope you would roll?  Please mark it.      1    
2    3    4    5    6     
 
  After you filled in the questionnaire and before you rolled the 
dice… 
fully                                     
fully   
disagree                           
agree 
I would have been very happy if I had rolled a 4. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I would have been very happy if I had rolled a 5. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I would have been very happy if I had rolled a 6. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I was hoping that I would roll a high number. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I was hoping to replace as many non-winning balls by winning balls 
as possible. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I felt that drawing a yellow (winning) ball would be very desirable. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I felt that drawing a yellow (winning) ball would be very important. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
Drawing a white (non-winning) ball would feel really bad. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I thought about reporting a high number, even if I would roll a low 
number. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I knew that nobody would ever know which number I actually 
rolled. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I thought that the experimenter would know which number I really 
rolled. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I felt that it was important to accurately report the number that I 
rolled. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
It was important to report my dice roll honestly. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I think that it is okay to report a higher number in this experiment. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
  How do you feel now? fully                                     
fully   
disagree                           
agree 
I am happy. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I am disappointed. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I think that I made the right decisions in this experiment. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
In hindsight, I would behave differently. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
I feel fairly treated. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    
9 
 
If you have any remarks, please write them on the 
backside. 
Thank you for your participation in this study!   
Dr. W. Steinel, Social & Organisational 
Psychology *  
wsteinel@fsw.le idenuniv.nl  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 9 Debriefing Form 
 
Thank you for participating in this study!  
 
The general purpose of this research is to investigate whether people report a different 
outcome of a dice roll than what they actually rolled when this behavior increases the 
likelihood to get a desired outcome (6 Euro cash), and whether this depends on framing 
(i.e., whether the ball draw is about winning 6 Euro or about not losing 6 Euro).  
In this study we recruited students at Leiden University who were randomly assigned to 
the loss frame condition and gain frame condition. You were asked to perform a different 
version of the dice under the cup paradigm. Specifically, you were asked to choose 
randomly a ball out of a container filled with six balls after rolling a regular six face dice. 
Firstly, the container was filled with six white balls. After the dice-roll, these balls were 
replaced with yellow balls depending on the report of the die roll. Every participant had 
to pick up randomly one ball from the container. In the gain frame condition the 
participant got the cash amount if he/she catch the yellow ball. If he/she catch the white 
ball, he/she did not receive the cash amount of six Euros. In the loss frame condition the 
participant got the cash amount before the dice roll. If he/ she catch the yellow ball, 
he/she could keep the money. If he/she catch the white ball, the had to turn the 6 euros 
back. 
In the loss-frame manipulation we expect that people will over-report 6 to fully remove 
the uncertainty and will under-report the outcomes below 6; in the gain-frame we expect 
that people will under-report 6 because this remove the chance to attribute extrinsically 
the desired outcome to luck and over-report 5 and maybe also 4.  
If you have further questions about the study, please ask the experimenter. You can also 
receive a research report; if you want this, please leave your email address on the reverse 
side of this form. If you have any complaints, you can contact dr. W. Steinel 
(wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl). 
You now have knowledge of relevant information concerning the research. We ask you to 
treat these information as confidential until the end of the study:  
 
 
Please do not talk about this study with other people, not to 
influence the behavior of future participants! Thank you! 
 
 
 
Please send me a research report: 
Name Email address 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
	
